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States and other governmental bodies increasingly invoke the government
speech defense to First Amendment challenges by private parties who seek to
alter or join what the government contends is its own expression. These
disputes involve competing claims to the same speech: a private party
maintains that a certain means of expression reflects (or should be allowed to
reflect) her own views, while a public entity claims that same speech as its
own, along with the ability to control its content.
In suggesting a framework for approaching these problems, this Article
starts by examining the theoretical and practical justifications for insulating
government speech from First Amendment scrutiny. It addresses the benefits
of government speech in facilitating self-governance so long as such speech
remains subject to political accountability checks like petitioning and voting.
It also explores the body of social science research that describes how a
message's source shapes its effectiveness, with special attention to the
government's role as the source - or perceived source - of a particular view.
Emphasizing that government speech is most valuable and least dangerous
when its governmental source is apparent, the Article then proposes that a
public entity seeking to claim the government speech defense must establish
that the contested expression is governmental in origin both formally (i.e., that
the government expressly claimed the speech as its own when it authorized the
communication) and functionally (i.e., that onlookers understand the speech to
be the government's at the time of its delivery). This dual requirement
maximizes prospects for meaningful credibility assessment and political
accountability by identifying two junctures at which government must expose
its expressive choices to the public: when it decides to express a certain idea
and when it actually communicates that idea.
The Article then draws from relevant experience in other areas to examine a
variety of characteristics - or "source cues" - that may signal a message 's
genesis as governmental or private. These include not only express indications
of a message 's origin, but also less direct signals like a message 's physical
location or onlookers' expectations based on past practice. The Article goes
on to apply this framework to several recurring challenges, exploring specific
features in a range of contexts that may obscure or reveal a message's
governmental source.
INTRODUCTION
A growing body of First Amendment litigation involves private parties who
seek to alter or join what the government contends is its own expression.
These disputes involve competing claims to the same speech: a private speaker
maintains that a communication reflects (or should be allowed to reflect) her
own views, while a governmental body characterizes that expression as its
[Vol. 88:587
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own, along with the ability to control its content. Examples include
Tennessee's decision to issue a "Choose Life" specialty license plate while
rejecting the ACLU's proposed "Pro-Choice" plate,' Missouri's refusal to
acknowledge the Ku Klux Klan on state Adopt-a-Highway signs, 2 and a public
school district's rejection of advocates' requests to post pro-voucher materials
on the district's webpage conveying the school board's opposition to voucher
legislation.
3
These clashes raise challenging issues because they involve elements of
both private and governmental expression when First Amendment analysis
generally demands a choice between the two. Indeed, the constitutional
standards for evaluating the government's own speech differ dramatically from
those that apply to the government's regulation of private expression. On the
one hand, of course, the First Amendment forbids government from regulating
private speech - including private speech in a government-created forum 4 - on
the basis of viewpoint.5 The First Amendment also bars the government from
forcing unwilling private speakers to affirm its views.
6
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has shielded the government's
expression from Free Speech Clause scrutiny, identifying political
accountability measures like voting and petitioning - rather than First
Amendment litigation - as the appropriate recourse for those displeased with
their government's message.7  Government speech merits this insulation
because it is both inevitable and valuable.8 In particular, government speech
facilitates significant First Amendment interests in sharing knowledge and
discovering truth by informing the public on a wide range of topics. These
I See ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom., Hill
v. Dixon, 548 U.S. 906 (2006).
2 See Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 737-38 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Rahn v.
Robb, 543 U.S. 1054 (2005).
3 See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL 2123784,
at *2-5 (D.S.C. July 20, 2007). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I served pro
bono as counsel of record in filing an amicus brief in support of respondent school board in
this case upon appeal. See Brief of Amici Nat'l Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al. in Support of
Affirmance, Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist One, No. 07-1697 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2007).
4 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-800 (1985).
5 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992).
6 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
7 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
8 See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000); Gia B.
Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 992
(2005); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 569 (1980).
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topics, for example, include the dangers of tobacco, 9 the increased risk of
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome associated with infants sleeping prone,' 0 and
the benefits of exercise and regular health screenings." Government speech
also furthers citizens' capacities to participate in democratic self-governance
by enabling them to identify their government's priorities and by providing
them with the opportunity to learn and evaluate the views of their elected
representatives. 12
But distinguishing between private and governmental speech is not always
easy. Courts often struggle with the challenge of parsing government
expression from private expression in the growing number of cases in which
public entities invoke the government speech defense to First Amendment
claims. For example, circuits have split in their characterizations of specialty
license plates as governmental or private speech. The Sixth Circuit concluded
that Tennessee's issuance of a "Choose Life" license plate reflected the
legislature's own pro-life views and thus constituted government speech within
the state's power to control. 3 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit characterized the
same plates as predominantly private expression, upholding Planned
Parenthood's free speech challenge to South Carolina's decision to issue a
"Choose Life" - and not a "Pro-Choice" - plate. 14 The Ninth Circuit did the
same in upholding the Arizona Life Coalition's challenge to Arizona's denial
of its proposed "Choose Life" plate.
15
As another example of courts' struggles to characterize speech as private or
governmental, the Eighth Circuit reached varying conclusions when
considering government efforts to avoid acknowledging the Klan's monetary
contributions or volunteer labor. One panel held that the University of
Missouri's public radio station did not violate the First Amendment when it
refused to accept, and thus acknowledge on-air, financial support from the
Klan. 16 A different panel later held that Missouri ran afoul of the First
9 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
31-40 (1964).
10 See Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: A
Population-Based Approach to the First Amendment, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 363, 378-80
(2006) (describing governmental public education campaign urging new parents to place
infants on their sides or backs to prevent SIDS).
ii See Proclamation No. 8003, 71 Fed. Reg. 20,863 (Apr. 24, 2006) (issuing President
George W. Bush's call upon Americans "to make daily exercise a priority").
12 Shiffrin, supra note 8, at 604.
13 ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375-77 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom., Hill
v. Dixon, 548 U.S. 906 (2006).
14 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004).
"s Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 05-16971, 2008 WE 217012, at *12 (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 2008).
16 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1091-96
(8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000).
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Amendment when it rejected the Klan's application to participate in a roadside
clean-up program that would require its recognition on a state Adopt-a-
Highway sign. 17 In both cases, Missouri argued that it sought simply to ensure
that its own expression was not misunderstood as endorsing the Klan, while the
Klan maintained that its private views had been targeted for discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment.
Conflicts like these illustrate the need for a coherent government speech
doctrine that parses the government's impermissible censorship of private
speech from its own legitimate expressive interests.1 8 To this end, Part I
examines the theoretical and practical justifications for insulating government
speech from First Amendment challenge. In particular, it explores the body of
social science research that describes how a message's source shapes its
effectiveness: in some contexts, expression that is attributed to the government
is more persuasive than speech attributed solely to private actors. 19
Misattributing private views to the government can thus skew public debate
and frustrate First Amendment values by misleading onlookers into evaluating
ideas differently than they would if those views were accurately assigned to a
private party. For these reasons, the government has a legitimate interest in
shielding its own expression from private speakers' efforts to join, alter, or
misappropriate it.
Those unhappy with the government's views, of course, remain free to try to
change them through political accountability measures like lobbying and
voting. But because the public can take such action only when it actually
understands the contested expression as the government's, Part II proposes that
the government speech defense insulates from First Amendment challenge
'7 Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 744-45 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom.,
Rahn v. Robb, 543 U.S. 1054 (2005); see also Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 708-09 (8th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Yarnell v. Cuffley, 532 U.S. 903 (2001),
18 As Robert Post observes, "[w]hat we have a right to expect from doctrine is that it
force[s] us to confront and clarify the constitutional values that matter to us." Robert Post,
Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 195 (1996).
19 1 first explored these problems in an earlier essay, where I argued that the government
should have considerable latitude to protect its speech from misappropriation by private
parties when it can demonstrate that it is literally speaking in a given context and that,
absent preventive action, reasonable onlookers would mistakenly perceive the government
as endorsing what are really the views of others. See Helen Norton, Not for Attribution:
Government's Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1317, 1349-50 (2004). This Article expands and improves on that work in several
ways. First, it engages social science insights about how a message's perceived source as
governmental alters its effectiveness, thus identifying additional support for the
government's interest in preserving the integrity of its own expression. Second, this Article
more precisely articulates a framework for determining a message's private or governmental
source, emphasizing the importance of establishing a message as governmental both
formally and functionally, and drawing from relevant experience in other areas to learn how
onlookers assess a message's source.
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only expression that is governmental in origin both formally (where the
government claims the speech as its own when it authorizes the
communication) and functionally (where onlookers understand the speech to be
the government's at the time of its delivery). Drawing from relevant
experience in other areas, Part II then examines a variety of characteristics - or
"source cues" - that may signal a message's genesis as governmental or
private. These include not only express indications of a message's origin, but
also less direct signals like a message's physical location or onlookers'
expectations based on past practice.
Part III then applies this framework to several recurring challenges,
exploring specific features in a range of contexts that may obscure or reveal the
government as a message's source. The Article concludes by urging that this
inquiry remain focused on whether we have enough information about a
message's source to identify it as the government's in a way that enables
members of the public to evaluate the message's credibility more accurately
and to engage in political accountability measures if they desire.
I. GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING ITS EXPRESSION FROM
MISAPPROPRIATION: HOW A MESSAGE'S PERCEIVED SOURCE SHAPES ITS
EFFECTIVENESS
Government expression contributes to important free speech values by
disseminating knowledge and informing citizens of their government's
priorities. But views mistakenly perceived as the government's potentially
undermine those interests in several ways. Not only does such misattribution
mislead the public about its government's actual values, but those views may
carry greater persuasive force than they would otherwise enjoy because a
message's source can - and often does - change its reception. This dynamic
threatens to skew the public debate and inhibit informed self-governance by
misleading onlookers into evaluating ideas differently than they would if those
views were accurately assigned to a private party.
Indeed, evidence from cognitive psychology and related fields reveals that
individuals often use a message's source as a mental shortcut, or heuristic, for
evaluating its quality. Studies confirm that the more credible a speaker, the
more likely her message will be effective, regardless of its content. 20 Because
speakers perceived as unpopular and/or unreliable will have more difficulty
20 E.g., Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias
Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task
Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460, 470 (1994);
Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication
Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 635, 650 (Winter 1951-52); Richard E. Petty et al.,
Central and Peripheral Routes to Advertising Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of
Involvement, 10 J. CONSUMER REs. 135, 143 (1983); Elaine Walster et al., On Increasing the
Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 325,
325-26 (1966).
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persuading listeners,2 1 they may be wise to seek the imprimatur of more
trustworthy sources, which may include the government. Moreover, the
perception that a message is endorsed by such sources can help dispel
onlookers' suspicion of perspectives understood to be in the speaker's own
interest. Social science researchers have concluded that "any communicator,
regardless of his prestige, will be more effective and will be seen as more
credible when he is arguing for a position opposed to his own best interest,
than when arguing for changes obviously in his own best interest. '22 Consider,
for example, the differing impact of the statement that "The Klan is a civic-
minded organization" when delivered by the government rather than by the
Klan itself.
Some onlookers also rely on the public's reaction to a message as a shortcut
for evaluating its content, using widespread acceptance or audience enthusiasm
to gauge a message's quality.23 Thus, to the extent that a government's views
are seen as a proxy for the opinion of the public that elected it, the
government's perceived endorsement may further improve a message's
effectiveness.
A message's perceived source as governmental thus plays a role in shaping
its effectiveness apart from its substantive content. 24 This is particularly true
of political issues, as individuals strapped for time often rely on cognitive
21 See June Fessenden-Raden et al., Providing Risk Information in Communities: Factors
Influencing What Is Heard and Accepted, 12 Sci., TECH., & HuM. VALUES 94, 100 (1987);
Bradley S. Greenberg & Gerald R. Miller, The Effects of Low-Credible Sources on Message
Acceptance, 33 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 127, 135 (1966); Homer H. Johnson & Richard R.
Izzett, The Effects of Source Identification on Attitude Change as a Function of the Type of
Communication, 86 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 81, 85-87 (1972) (concluding that high-credibility
sources were more likely to influence attitude change than low-credibility sources).
22 Walster et al., supra note 20, at 325; see also Alice H. Eagly et al., Causal Inferences
About Communicators and Their Effect on Opinion Change, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 424, 432 (1978); Roobina Ohanian, The Impact of Celebrity Spokespersons'
Perceived Image on Consumers' Intention to Purchase, J. ADVERTISING RES., Feb.-Mar.
1991, at 46, 46-47 (describing objectivity as a measure of a source's credibility, along with
expertise, knowledge, and attractiveness).
23 See Danny Axsom et al., Audience Response as a Heuristic Cue in Persuasion, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 30, 36-37 (1987); Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 20, at
461; Diana C. Mutz, Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public Opinion on
Political Attitudes, 14 POL. BEHAV. 89, 96-100, 111 (1992) (describing studies concluding
that, for some onlookers, "public opinion simply serves as a cue indicating the most
intelligent choice to make").
24 Reliance on such heuristics is not, however, inevitable. Onlookers with the motivation
and the ability to expend the necessary cognitive resources on a particular matter are less
likely to rely on source cues or other mental shortcuts and more likely to evaluate a
message's substantive content for themselves. Jeffery J. Mondak, Source Cues and Policy
Approval: The Cognitive Dynamics of Public Support for the Reagan Agenda, 37 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 186, 188 (1993) [hereinafter Mondak, Source Cues].
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shortcuts to inform their judgments about a variety of complicated matters. As
Dan Kahan and Donald Braman have observed:
[C]itizens aren 't in a position to figure out through personal investigation
whether the death penalty deters, gun control undermines public safety,
commerce threatens the environment, et cetera. They have to take the
word of those whom they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical
claims, and what sorts of data supporting such claims, are credible. The
people they trust, naturally, are the ones who share their values - and who
as a result of this same dynamic and others are predisposed to a particular
view.
25
For these reasons, where the government seems an expert, objective, or
otherwise trustworthy source, its endorsement gives the ideas it trumpets (or is
perceived as trumpeting) more acceptance than they would otherwise enjoy.
Consider, for example, the compelling effects on public opinion of charges in
2003 by Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Bush that Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction: half of Americans continued to
believe those assertions in 2004 even after experts and policymakers alike had
concluded that no such weapons existed.
26
Furthermore, the license plates, highway signs, websites, and other
communicative means often at the heart of government speech disputes are
especially powerful because of the extensive audience they reach as forms of
mass media.27 Moreover, at least some of them additionally carry the potential
for multiple views by the same onlooker, with this additional exposure further
enhancing their effectiveness. Indeed, the more an individual encounters the
same message, the more persuasive that idea may become by virtue of repeated
exposure. 28  Behavioral research indicates that mass media can also be
25 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 149, 151 (2006); see also Jeffery J. Mondak, Public Opinion and Heuristic
Processing of Source Cues, 15 POL. BEHAV. 167, 170 (1993) [hereinafter Mondak, Public
Opinion]; John Gastil et al., Ending Polarization: The Good News About the Culture Wars,
BOSTON REv., Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 19 ("Unable to work through the details of a complex
issue (such as global warming), most citizens can easily figure out where they should stand
by referencing cultural authorities - Ted Kennedy or Rush Limbaugh, The New York Times
or Fox News - and aligning themselves accordingly.").
26 See Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the
Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 649,649-51 (2006).
27 See Thomas D. Elias, Adopt-a-Highway Project Cleans Up, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 1,
1992, at A8 ("The manager of a Los Angeles McDonald's whose golden arches adorn a sign
along a nearby freeway says, 'You can't beat the advertising. There must be 120,000 cars a
day going by that sign.').
28 See KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION IN PRACTICE 106 (1991). But see
Carolyn Tripp et al., The Effects of Multiple Product Endorsements by Celebrities in
Consumers' Attitudes and Intentions, 20 J. CONSUMER RES. 535, 536, 544-45 (1994)
(commenting that while increased exposure may initially result in a more favorable
[Vol. 88:587
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especially persuasive because they do not often require onlookers to engage,
rebut, and thus formulate the sorts of counter-arguments that can undermine a
message's effectiveness. 29 Together, these dynamics underscore not only the
power of mass media, but also the government's legitimate interest in
protecting its expression in these contexts from misappropriation.
Of course, a message's source can have positive or negative effects on its
persuasiveness, depending on observers' assessments of the source's
credibility and/or popularity. 30  And because public attitudes towards
government vary widely - depending on the government, the audience, and the
issue - assessments of government credibility differ too. 3' As Gia Lee and
Lawrence Lessig separately point out, purposefully masking a message's
governmental source may improve its reception in certain circumstances.
32
Lessig, for example, explains that the government may sometimes seek to
change social meaning by finding more credible conduits for its speech.
33
According to Lessig, people react strongly to efforts by the government and
other powerful groups to manipulate social meaning; therefore, such efforts are
less effective than communication which does not appear to be influenced by
the government or another powerful source - what he calls the "Orwell
effect."'34 Consequently, the government will seek to minimize the extent to
which the public attributes messages to it and instead will tie its messages to
authorities perceived as more independent, like doctors or scientists.
35
response, higher numbers of exposure may eventually trigger negative responses, perhaps
due to tedium).
29 See REARDON, supra note 28, at 169 ("[W]hen people are opposed to a certain
perspective and realize that they may be required to make some statement, they will create
counterarguments. What of media participants, who know that they will not be required to
respond in any overt manner? They are uncritical participants. Thus they are vulnerable to
persuasion.").
30 Mondak, Source Cues, supra note 24, at 193.
31 See Fessenden-Raden et al., supra note 21, at 96 (finding that the trust people have in
political institutions varies, as does their trust in the information provided by such
governments); Mondak, Public Opinion, supra note 25, at 171 ("The direction and
magnitude of influence source cues exert on an individual's judgments should vary as a
function of the citizen's opinion regarding the expertise or credibility of the political leader
in question .... Therefore, a source effect can be either positive or negative, with the
effect's magnitude dependent on the strength of that approval or disapproval.").
32 Lee, supra note 8, at 1009; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 943., 1017 (1995).
33 Lessig, supra note 32, at 1017-18.
34 Id.
35 Id.; see also Ann Bartow, Trademarks of Privilege: Naming Rights and the Physical
Public Domain, 40 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 919, 932-33 (2007), stating:
Because a naming gesture imputes social meaning to the physical public domain, acts
of visible branding can infuse a public facility with strong associative values that affect
public perceptions and permeate the collective public conscience. For example, both
residents and outsiders are likely to view a community in which a public school is
2008]
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Lessig thoughtfully describes the various techniques for changing a
message's meaning that might be employed by private as well as government
speakers. "Tying," for example, involves "attempts to transform the social
meaning of one act by tying it to, or associating it with, another social meaning
that conforms to the meaning that the architect wishes the managed act to have.
The tied text thereby gains some of the associated meaning of the tied-to
text."' 36 Common examples of "tying" include celebrity endorsements, but, as
Lessig observes, "[t]he link can transfer negative as well as positive value. A
candidate for Congress ties her opponent to the President, hoping that negative
views about the President will transfer to the opponent.
37
Lee is especially concerned that the government may manipulate the
public's attitudes towards its views by deliberately obscuring its identity as a
message's source.38 She focuses on government speakers who seek to shape
public opinion by attributing government views to private actors perceived as
less self-interested or otherwise more credible - citing, for example,
government-produced video news segments distributed to and aired by the
media without attribution to the government. 39 Governmental manipulation of
this sort is dangerous, Lee observes, because "non-transparent communications
undermine mechanisms of political accountability, both by precluding
individuals from knowing when, and to what extent, the government is
responsible for specific speech and by enabling the government to skew
individuals' perceptions of the actual support for its ideas."
40
Given that free speech doctrine generally leaves individuals to their own
devices to guard against deception and trusts that truth will eventually triumph
over falsity,4 1 some might condemn such concerns about misattribution as
paternalistic. But like many market theories, the traditional "marketplace of
ideas" metaphor relies on assumptions that are not always empirically
supported - e.g., that individuals consistently act rationally based on complete
named for Robert E. Lee very differently from a community in which a public school is
named for Martin Luther King, Jr.
36 Lessig, supra note 32, at 1009.
37 Id.
38 Lee, supra note 8, at 985-89.
39 Id. at 990 ("The government, in other words, may make its views appear to be held by
more esteemed or authoritative sources than they necessarily are, and more widely accepted
than they really are.").
40 Id. at 1039.
41 See Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in
the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 6 (2003); Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the
First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L.
REv. 1107, 1108 (2006) ("In many circumstances the First Amendment is no bar to
government measures condemning deceptions by statement or concealment, whether
government or private parties are the deceivers or the deceived.").
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information. 42 Indeed, the Supreme Court already recognizes the possibility of
such market failures with its refusal to protect misleading commercial speech
in order to safeguard listeners from deception.43  For similar reasons,
government speech doctrine should acknowledge that time-strapped onlookers
employ often-inaccurate cognitive shortcuts like relying on a message's source
as a proxy for its quality.
While Lee accurately identifies the significant dangers that emerge when
government masks its role as a message's source, parallel concerns arise when
private speakers seek the government's perceived imprimatur to manipulate
onlookers' common - indeed, sometimes automatic - reliance on an idea's
source as the measure of its value. Either way, misidentifying a message's
author can change its reception and thus skew the surrounding public debate.
44
Consider, for example, the differing effects of the following statements: "The
Confederate flag is a symbol of heritage not hate," when delivered by the State
of Virginia as opposed to the private organization Sons of Confederate
Veterans; "Choose Life," when communicated by the state of Illinois as
opposed to the National Right to Life Coalition; or "Human behavior does not
contribute significantly to climate change" when uttered by the U.S. Secretary
of Energy as opposed to an oil company executive.
45
Government speech is thus most valuable and least dangerous when its
governmental source is apparent, enabling the public to more accurately assess
the message's credibility and to take accountability measures as appropriate.
The remainder of this Article explores in more detail the exercise of assessing
the governmental or private source of contested expression.
II. ASSESSING A MESSAGE'S SOURCE AS PRIVATE OR GOVERNMENTAL
While no consensus approach to these disputes has yet emerged - indeed,
"[t]he Supreme Court has provided very little guidance as to what constitutes
government speech"46 - a number of lower courts have synthesized various
appellate decisions to create a four-factor test for characterizing speech as
private or governmental by examining:
42 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 592 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For these reasons, a number of commentators
thus urge that we discard a libertarian approach to First Amendment interpretation. See
Bambauer, supra note 26, at 696-703; Horwitz, supra note 41, at 6.
43 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563-64.
44 Note that such misperceptions not only skew public debate but may also frustrate
individual autonomy interests. See Varat, supra note 41, at 1110.
41 See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO
L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 14-16, available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=-103 1733) (describing efforts of tobacco companies, Wal-Mart, and other
commercial entities to build support for their products by manufacturing perceived third-
party endorsements).
46 Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001).
2008]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
(1) the central "purpose" of the program in which the speech in question
occurs; (2) the degree of "editorial control" exercised by the government
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the
"literal" speaker; and (4) whether the government or the private entity
bears the "ultimate responsibility" for the content of the speech . . .47
And while expressing some uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court's
decision in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing. Ass 'n48 delivered a definitive test
for identifying government speech, 49 some lower courts have also emphasized
two factors highlighted in that case: (1) whether the government established
the overall message to be communicated and (2) whether the government
approved "every word" of the message ultimately disseminated.50
While courts applying any or all of these factors have yet to identify their
underlying theoretical justification,5 1 these considerations appear to reflect
courts' intuitive yet not-fully-articulated sense of the need to insist on a clearly
governmental source to ensure that government can be held accountable for the
speech it claims as its own. For example, a government program's
communicative "purpose" - e.g., a public school's educational objective or a
public broadcaster's journalistic mission - may bolster the government's
claim that it intends to speak in a particular setting. 52 A government that
establishes an overall message and approves its every word may be understood
as claiming authorship of that expression, as might a public entity that
maintains "editorial control" over a message's content. Onlookers generally
identify "the literal speaker" of a message as its source, absent some disclaimer
or clarification, and "ultimate responsibility" is largely synonymous with
accountability. Courts' use of these factors, however, would be significantly
more defensible from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint if they
explained why they chose to rely on them - for example, by showing how each
factor furthers or frustrates a finding of a message's governmental source, with
attendant implications for accountability and credibility assessment.
A number of thoughtful scholars have proposed approaches to assessing
government speech claims that attend more directly to ensuring a message's
17 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Wells, 257 F.3d at 1140-41. Not all lower courts
apply the four-factor test. See, e.g., Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005).
48 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
49 See Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, No. 05-16971, 2008 WL 217012, at *4-5 (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 2008); ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375, 380 (6th Cir. 2006); Page v. Lexington
County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL 162178, at *23 n.23 (D.S.C. Jan. 17,
2007).
o Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
51 See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618, en banc reh 'g denied, 305
F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc).
52 See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV.
L. REv. 84, 120 (1998).
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governmental origin, although they couch their preferred frameworks in
somewhat different terms. Professors Bezanson and Buss, for example, would
define government speech in terms of intent and effect: "purposeful action by
government, expressing its own distinct message, which is understood by those
who receive it to be the government's message." 53 Professor Gielow Jacobs'
requirements of both general and specific accountability 54  similarly
foreshadow in part the principles of formal and functional authorship upon
which I rely in assessing government speech. And Professor Lee identifies
transparency as the key to government speech, defining transparency to mean
that "a reasonable recipient understands that the government bears
responsibility for a communication. '55 While sharing these writers' focus on
meaningful accountability as a key measure of government speech, this Article
grapples more specifically with what this theoretical foundation actually
demands in practice.
Building on these efforts, this Part examines in more detail the exercise of
determining a message's source, consistent with the theoretical demands of
meaningful accountability. It proposes that the government can establish its
entitlement to the government speech defense only when it establishes itself as
the source of that expression both as a formal and as a functional matter. In
other words, government must expressly claim the speech as its own when it
authorizes or creates a communication and onlookers must understand the
message to be the government's at the time of its delivery. If the government
can satisfy both of these elements, thus establishing the speech as its own, then
it is free to control its message without Free Speech Clause scrutiny. By
identifying two junctures at which the government must expose its expressive
choices to the public, this approach maximizes opportunities for undeceived
credibility assessments and meaningful political accountability.5 6 If, however,
political accountability is not available as a check on the government because
13 Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1384 (2001).
14 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech,
36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 57, 61 (2002). In addition to accountability measures,
Professor Jacobs's proposed framework also includes attention to whether the government
delivers an "identifiable and constitutionally valid message" with "non-speech-suppressing
impact." Id. at 113.
55 Lee, supra note 8, at 1052.
56 For an example of expression that may satisfy the requirement of formal, but not
functional, government authorship, see infra notes 66, 145, 215 and accompanying text
(discussing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)). For an example of
expression that may satisfy the requirement of functional, but not formal, government
authorship, see infra note 110 (discussing Brown v. Cal. Dep't. of Transp., 321 F.3d 1217
(9th Cir. 2003)).
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the governmental source is obscured, then the safeguards of traditional First
Amendment analysis should apply.
5 7
Before turning to these twin requirements of formal and functional
government ownership in more detail, two caveats are in order. First, note that
legal constraints other than the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause may
still limit governmental speech. Expression that is governmental in source
both formally and functionally may still, for example, contravene the
Constitution's Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses if it endorses religion
or furthers racial discrimination. 58 Government speech of a partisan nature,
moreover, may in some settings violate constitutional constraints like the
Guarantee Clause or statutory limitations like state and federal laws prohibiting
the use of government resources for campaign speech.5 9
Second, while contending that the government does not violate private
parties' First Amendment rights when it prevents them from joining or altering
what is really the government's own speech, I do not claim that government
generally has First Amendment rights of its own.60 Laws limiting government
57 Note, too, that speech that satisfies this test will almost certainly satisfy lower courts'
four-factor test, which attempts less directly - and in a way less clearly grounded in the
theoretical foundations of government speech - to capture some of the same concerns.
Similarly, although the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a definitive test for government
speech, expression that satisfies my proposed requirements of formal and functional
transparency more than satisfies the Court's Johanns factors - which, as described in more
detail below, do not require any showing of functional transparency. See infra notes 212-16
and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 8, at 37-38.
" See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 n.3 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 845-47 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the military's actual or perceived endorsement of political
candidates would offend Article II, Section 2 and its guarantee of civilian control of the
military); MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 170, 302 (1983); Edward H.
Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship,
21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 586-98, 605 n.169 (1980).
60 See YUDOF, supra note 59, at 44 (arguing that government does not possess First
Amendment free speech rights); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 53, at 1501-08 (same). For
an argument that state governments may be First Amendment rights-holders, see David
Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1637, 1638-47
(2006). Note also the Court has suggested that certain institutions with unique
communicative functions - such as universities or broadcasters - may have First
Amendment interests regardless of their public or private character. See, e.g., Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Ark. Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998). But see United States v. Am. Library Ass'n,
539 U.S. 194, 210-11 (2003) (declining to decide whether government entities have First
Amendment rights).
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expression - such as statutes regulating certain partisan speech by government
actors 6' - thus face no free speech clause constraint.
62
A. Establishing Expression's Governmental Source as a Formal Matter
Establishing formal government authorship demands that the government
make clear its intent to communicate its own views at the time it creates or
authorizes the expression. 63 As Mark Fenster observes, the government's
public justifications for its choices "promote rational, critical public debate and
unrestricted communication in order to enable development of a functional,
democratic public sphere. In short, liberal democratic theory requires the state
to give an account of itself to its public and to justify its actions to the
individual and community." 64 Requiring that the government identify itself as
the source of a message as a formal matter forces the government to articulate,
61 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7323-7324 (2000) (prohibiting use of official authority to affect
election results and barring use of government property or facilities for partisan activities);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-8-205(b)(2) (2003) (prohibiting state police from displaying political
banners, posters, or literature on state government offices, facilities, or other buildings);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-8-205(b)(3) (2003) (prohibiting state police vehicles from displaying
any political bumper stickers or decals and prohibiting their use to promote or assist any
political campaign).
62 My contention that government should remain free to deny private speakers the
opportunity to speak in a setting that mistakenly conveys the government's endorsement
may also be unattractive to those who ascribe to "the more speech, the better" approach -
i.e., those who identify the First Amendment's fundamental value as fostering private
speakers' individual autonomy and maximizing opportunities for self-expression. See, e.g.,
John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 51-52 (1996).
But scholars have long disagreed over whether any single core value animates the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional
Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1987)
("Most theoretical writings have suggested variants of four different values as critical to
speech protection: individual development, democratic government, social stability, and
truth." (citations omitted)); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980).
I join those who contend that the First Amendment principally furthers the collective
instrumental value of facilitating democratic self-governance through public debate. See,
e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 39 (2005); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 256; Robert Post, Compelled
Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SuP. CT. REV.
195, 213; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263 (1992).
63 The "ultimate responsibility," "program purpose," and "editorial control" elements of
the four-factor test - along with the considerations mentioned in Johanns - for identifying
government speech might be seen as courts' attempts to capture this notion of government's
affirmative claim of ownership of a particular communication. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
64 Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 897 (2006).
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and thus think carefully about, its expressive decisions. It also prevents after-
the-fact manufacture of a government speech defense as an opportunistic
reaction to thwart those challenging the government's regulation of what is
really private speech. 65 In this manner, the government pays for its ability to
invoke the government speech defense by articulating its intent to take political
responsibility for its expressive choices.
For an example of speech that satisfies the requirement of formal
government authorship, consider the beef promotion campaign at issue in
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n. 66 As the Supreme Court emphasized,
Congress determined the campaign's overarching message at the time of its
authorization, making clear its intent to express a federal policy "of promoting
the marketing and consumption of 'beef and beef products,' using funds raised
by an assessment on cattle sales and importation.
67
Other examples of expression that satisfy the requirement of formal
government origin include a school board's resolution authorizing the district's
celebration of Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month and approving the posting
of supportive materials on school bulletin boards, 68 as well as a school board's
resolution authorizing public communication of its opposition to proposed
voucher legislation.69 In these cases, transparent deliberations by a public
entity about whether to authorize such expression provide the public with
valuable information about their government's priorities, as well as meaningful
opportunities to engage in political accountability measures.
On the other hand, the government can decline to claim certain speech as its
own as a formal matter.70 Examples include a public school that cedes to
students the power to name school buildings, 71 a city or county that sells the
65 See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 53, at 1510.
66 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
67 Id. at 553.
68 See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2000).
69 See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL
2123784, at *1 (D.S.C. July 20, 2007).
70 Mark Yudof describes one such situation:
For example, there is nothing constitutionally amiss about a university placing the
editorial functions of a college newspaper entirely in the hands of the faculty or the
central administration. The university could reserve editorial control over the editorial
page but not over the news columns. Or it might delegate all editorial functions - over
news, advertising, and the editorial page itself- to a student board of editors.
YUDOF, supra note 59, at 243.
71 See, e.g., Mike Jaccarino & Karen Angel, 'Terrorist' Lauded at CUNY, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 12, 2006, at 5 (describing a university's unwillingness to force students to
change the controversial name of the building). But see Editorial, CUNY Expels Killers,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 13, 2006, at 39 (describing the university's later change in position,
stating: "Only the CUNY board of trustees has the authority to name or rename school
facilities").
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rights to name its stadiums or other facilities to private parties, 72 or "vanity
stamp" and "vanity license plate" programs, where the government sells
advertising space on public property rather than claim that same space for its
own expressive purposes.73 Government regulation of what then must be
private expression - because the government has declined to claim it as its own
- of course falls under the constraints of traditional First Amendment analysis,
including its prohibition on viewpoint-based regulation.
B. Establishing Expression's Governmental Source as a Functional Matter
Even if government expressly announces its intent to claim authorship of
certain communication at the time of its creation, much of the public may
remain unaware of this decision until that message is ultimately delivered.
Absent an understanding of the message's governmental source, onlookers
cannot fully evaluate the message's credibility, nor will they realize the
possibility of holding the government accountable as the source of messages
they find objectionable. Challenges thus remain in determining whether
onlookers will perceive that expression to be governmental when the message
is received.
74
Some commentators remain concerned about the practical demands of such
an inquiry. Professors Bezanson and Buss, for example, emphasize the
difficulties in determining onlooker perception:
Attribution, in short, is a difficult, subtle, fact-intensive, and
circumstance-specific question. A standard based on reasonableness of
third parties' perceptions, even relatively informed third parties, is pretty
loose sand on which to build the foundation of a test intended to
safeguard the First Amendment interests of competing private speech
claimants.
75
But such difficulties are not insurmountable. Assessing reasonable
individuals' perceptions remains a commonplace inquiry in many areas of the
72 For example, Denver's Metropolitan Football Stadium District, a public entity
overseeing construction of the new Denver Broncos' stadium, sold twenty-year naming
rights to Invesco Funds Group, Inc. in 2001. See Cindy Brovsky, Out With the New Stadium
Name, In With the Old, DENVER POST, Aug. 8, 2001, at B I; see also Joseph Blocher, School
Naming Rights and the First Amendment's Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2007); Robert
H. Thomburg, Note, Stadium Naming Rights: An Assessment of the Contract and
Trademark Issues Inherent to Both Professional and Collegiate Stadiums, 2 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 328, 333 (2003). Indeed, the lease agreements for most stadiums grant the lessee
(i.e., a professional sports team) naming rights for the lease term. See, e.g., Larry Fish,
Stadium Approved, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 28, 2000, at A3.
13 See infra Part III.A.
7' The "literal speaker" and "ultimate responsibility" elements of lower courts' four-
factor test for identifying government speech, described supra at note 47 and accompanying
text, might be seen as courts' attempts to capture this notion of functional transparency.
71 Bezanson & Buss, supra note 53, at 1482-83.
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law, and one that judges and juries are frequently called upon to perform when
evaluating constitutional, statutory, and common law claims in both civil and
criminal contexts.76 Indeed, a number of doctrines - such as the endorsement
test for Establishment Clause claims and the test for trademark infringement -
specifically require courts to evaluate onlookers' perceptions of a message's
source.77  Furthermore, while often "fact-intensive[] and circumstance-
specific," 78 a functional analysis of a message's source may be guided by
attention to specific triggers, or source cues, 79 upon which individuals
frequently rely in determining a message's origins. The remainder of this Part
considers several possible cues to a message's governmental source, evaluating
their strengths and limitations in facilitating meaningful credibility assessment
and political accountability.
1. Express Cues
A message often expressly signals its genesis at the time of its delivery.
Straightforward examples include government press conferences where the
government's position is communicated by a public official, press statements
appearing on government letterhead and attributed to a government source, or
reports on the dangers of smoking or the importance of energy conservation
where the government expressly identifies itself as the author.80 Because the
expression's origins are so clearly exposed, the public's evaluation will not be
skewed by misperceptions as to its source, and those displeased with the
message know to complain to (or about) the government.81
76 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1993) (assessing hostile
work environment claims based on a reasonable person standard); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (holding that a person is "seized" for Fourth
Amendment purposes when a reasonable person in the same situation would have believed
she was not free to leave); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988) ("A person is
justified in using force against an aggressor when... he or she reasonably believes such
force to be necessary."); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (W. Page Keeton
ed., 5th ed. 1984) (assessing negligence based on a reasonable person standard).
77 See infra notes 87, 120 and accompanying text.
71 See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 53, at 1482.
79 See, e.g., Mondak, Public Opinion, supra note 25, at 169-72.
81 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 9; NAT'L
ENERGY POLICY DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2001). The "literal speaker"
element of the four-part test for assessing government speech used by some lower courts
may be seen as another way to capture this notion of express source cues. See supra note 47
and accompanying text.
81 As one example of speech that expressly signaled its governmental source, consider
the remarks of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Cully Stimson.
In a 2007 radio interview in his official capacity, Mr. Stimson expressed shock that lawyers
at many top law firms represented Guantanamo detainees and urged their clients in the
business community to switch to other firms. Pentagon Official Who Criticized Detainee
Lawyers Quits, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2007, at A6. Mr. Stimson was identified by name and
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Because they are so clear, express cues are most helpful in assessing a
message's governmental origins and thus facilitating meaningful
accountability. For this reason, governments seeking to protect the integrity of
their own expression should design their communications in a way that
enhances, rather than obscures, transparency by employing express cues
whenever possible. As an incentive for governments to engage in such
transparency, express cues might trigger a rebuttable presumption that a
contested message is governmental in origin and thus free from Free Speech
Clause scrutiny, while their absence may be presumed to signal a
nongovernmental source.82 Such presumptions may be especially helpful in
difficult cases.
Harder cases arise when no cue directly indicates a message's origin, or
where available cues send mixed or ambiguous signals. Although a substantial
body of social science evidence confirms that a message's source - once
established - may shape its effectiveness, 83 available behavioral research
provides virtually no guidance about how onlookers determine a message's
origins when that source is contested. 84 Future research in this area would help
inform our judgments with scientific evidence, rather than simply intuition and
personal experience.8
5
position, clearly revealing the expressed views as governmental in origin. His remarks
generated considerable outrage in the form of protests by bar leaders, law school deans, and
others in the legal community, and he ultimately resigned as a result of the political
pressure, illustrating political accountability in action as a check on government speech. See
id.
82 See B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of
the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REv. 491, 541-42 (2005) (proposing, in the
Establishment Clause context, a rebuttable presumption against religious displays on
government property absent a government showing that the message is "unequivocally
secular and nonendorsing").
83 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
84 Although little social science evidence to date addresses the question of how onlookers
identify the source of a particular message when that source is unclear, researchers have
examined other issues related to source attribution, such as individuals' later ability to recall
the uncontested source of an idea accurately. See generally Ute J. Bayen et al., Source
Discrimination, Item Detection, and Multinomial Models of Source Monitoring, 22 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 197 (1996); Gerald Echterhoff & Walter Hussy, Strategies of
Source Attribution: Semantic Features and Trace Strength as Cues to the Origin of
Memories, 63 Swiss J. PSYCH. 93 (2004); Joshua D. Landau et al., Dissociation of Two
Kinds of Source Attributions, 113 AM. J. PSYCH. 539 (2000); Michel Tuan Pham & Gita
Venkataramani Johar, Contingent Processes of Source Identification, 24 J. CONSUMER RES.
249 (1997).
85 See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REv. 997, 1000
(2006); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REv. 115, 118 (2003). Note, however, that this
development is not without its critics. See Zick, supra, at 221.
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In the meantime, exploring the less-than-express source cues relied upon by
courts in a range of contexts may help guide our inquiry, while also illustrating
the challenges of this endeavor. As we shall see, these indirect cues carry both
strengths and weaknesses in their ability to signal a message's governmental
origins, and thus their capacity to further meaningful accountability.
86
2. Lessons from Endorsement Analysis
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause inquiry provides a helpful
parallel to the public's assessment of a message's origin as governmental or
private. The Court has sometimes evaluated Establishment Clause claims by
determining whether reasonable onlookers would perceive the government to
be endorsing religious expression or otherwise "appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief,"87 thus sending "a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community." 88 While endorsement analysis is controversial 89 and
its continuing vitality unclear, 90 it illuminates courts' assessments of whether
and when the public will perceive the government to be the source of a
particular message in one specific context. To be sure, much of the Court's
endorsement analysis focuses on whether onlookers would understand what
was concededly the government's own expression to be religious or secular in
content9' - an inquiry that raises unusual challenges because it may depend in
86 The limitations of these source cues also support the case for testing courts'
assessments of sources through social science research. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 85,
at 1006-07 ("When subjected to empirical scrutiny, 'common sense' theories of how people
perceive and judge themselves and others in their social environment often turn out to be
wrong. Behavioral realism, understood as a prescriptive theory of judicial decisionmaking,
addresses this problem by proposing that, before judges use lay or 'common sense'
psychological theories in their legal analysis, they should take reasonable steps to ensure
that those theories are valid.").
87 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989).
88 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89 For a sampling of commentary critical of the Court's endorsement analysis, see, for
example, Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 463, 478-79; Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 267
(1987).
9o See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-
Sorting Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 137 ("With the departure of Justice O'Connor -
the author and most committed supporter of the endorsement notion - there is a good chance
that the test will retire along with her.").
91 See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601, 620 (holding that the government's
decision to acknowledge Christmas through the display of a creche impermissibly endorsed
a patently religious message, while its display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree
endorsed only the holidays' secular aspects); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 685 (holding that the
[Vol. 88:587
THE MEASURE OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
part on the observer's status as a religious insider or outsider.92 More relevant
to the inquiry here, and perhaps more straightforward, are the Court's efforts to
determine whether onlookers would attribute a concededly religious display to
the government or to a private party.
a. The Message's Location as a Cue to Its Source
In the Establishment Clause context, the Court has observed that absent
express source cues to the contrary, onlookers often attribute signs, displays,
and other visual messages to the owner of the property where they appear.
93
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, for example, wrestled
with whether and when reasonable onlookers would perceive the state as
endorsing a cross that appeared prominently on government property. 94 The
Court considered the State's rejection of the Klan's request to post a cross in
the capitol square for fear that the display would constitute government
endorsement of Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause.95
Although the plurality ultimately found, for a range of reasons, that the State
did not violate the Establishment Clause, 96 all of the Justices acknowledged
that, absent an express notice or disclaimer, onlookers could mistakenly
perceive the cross as the government's speech because the cross stood on its
property.
97
government's inclusion of a nativity scene in a display featuring a number of secular
symbols of Christmas did not impermissibly endorse Christianity).
92 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1293 (2d ed. 1988); Hill,
supra note 82, at 518.
9' See, e.g., County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 599-600.
94 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758-59 (1995).
Eight of the Justices assumed that the cross sent a religious message, and focused on
whether its display on government property signaled the government's endorsement of that
message. See id. at 760 (stating that the speech was religious); id. at 761 (stating that the
board rejected the display because it was religious and wanted to avoid endorsing a religion
as required by the Establishment Clause); id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
the majority that it was religious expression). Justice Thomas's concurrence, however,
argued that the Klan's use of the cross was intended to convey a political, rather than a
religious, message. Id. at 770-71 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 757 (plurality opinion).
96 Id. at 763-70.
97 Id. at 768; id. at 769 n.4 (noting that an observer might be "misled" by the presence of
the cross in Capitol Square if any disclaimer were of insufficient size or if the observer
failed to inquire whether the State had sponsored the cross); id. at 776 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("[C]ertain aspects of the cross display in this case arguably intimate
government approval of respondents' private religious message - particularly that the cross
is an especially potent sectarian symbol which stood unattended in close proximity to
official government buildings."); id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[1]n some
circumstances an intelligent observer may mistake private, unattended religious displays in a
public forum for government speech endorsing religion."); id. at 801 (Stevens, J.,
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According to Justice Souter's concurrence, for example, unattended displays
on government property enhance the possibility of misattribution.98 While an
observer watching an individual speak in a public forum tends to attribute the
speech to the speaker, one observing "an unattended display (and any message
it conveys)" tends to attribute the display "to the owner of the land on which it
stands." 99 Thus, when the State maintains the Klan's cross in front of the
statehouse, the Court should consider "the power of a symbol standing alone
and unexplained" in determining whether that unattended display conveys "a
forbidden message of endorsement."' 0 0
In his dissent, Justice Stevens also emphasized that an unattended display's
location is a significant cue in determining its source. Demonstrations and
parades on public property, for example, usually remain easily identifiable as
expressing the views of nongovernmental speakers. 10' On the other hand, an
observer viewing an "unattended, immoveable structure" on the lawn of the
capitol building would likely identify the State as the messenger. 02 Justice
Stevens contrasts "the image of the cross standing alone and unattended" with
"the image the observer would take away were a hooded Klansman holding, or
standing next to, the very same cross."'
103
As another example of the strength of a message's location as a cue to its
source - and thus to its power and meaning - consider the Court's discussion
in City ofLadue v. Gilleo.104 There the Court upheld a free speech challenge to
a city ban on homeowners' posting of signs, observing that the city had
completely foreclosed a means of signaling a communication's source that is
not only common, but also important and distinctive. For example, displaying
a sign from one's home conveys a different message than displaying the same
sign somewhere else or by some other means.'0 5 To use Justice Stevens'
example, a "Peace in the Gulf' sign displayed on the front lawn of a retired
general or decorated war veteran will likely invoke a different reaction than the
dissenting) ("[T]he location of a stationary, unattended sign generally is both a component
of its message and an implicit endorsement of that message by the party with the power to
decide whether it may be conveyed from that location."); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Near the stationary cross were the government's flags and the government's
statues. No human speaker was present to disassociate the religious symbol from the State.
No other private display was in sight. No plainly visible sign informed the public that the
cross belonged to the Klan and that Ohio's government did not endorse the display's
message.").
98 Id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring).
99 Id.
100 Id.
oI Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id.
103 Id.
04 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
'05 Id. at 56.
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same sign in a young child's bedroom window or as a bumper sticker on a
passing car.
10 6
For similar reasons, the expressive choices reflected in a facility's name -
e.g., the Ronald Reagan National Airport or the Robert F. Kennedy
Department of Justice Building - often expressly signal their governmental
origin because of their intimate connection with government property. 07
Similarly, expressive decorations on government buildings also effectively
signal their governmental source because onlookers generally understand a
message to spring from the owner of the property on which it appears. For this
reason, a state's expressive choice to display the United States, Confederate, or
some other flag on its property remains transparently governmental as a
functional matter, 108 as does a mayor's decision to display in City Hall only
patriotic art for the city's Fourth of July celebration, or art advocating racial
equality for its observance of Black History Month. 0 9
106 Id. at 54-57.
107 Recall, however, that a public entity remains free to decline to claim a building's
naming as its own expression and instead to sell or otherwise cede that power to private
parties, thus disavowing formal authorship and abandoning any regulation inconsistent with
traditional First Amendment doctrine. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. This
practice, of course, may trigger concerns outside the First Amendment. See Bartow, supra
note 35, at 929 ("Naming practices are important because the names of public amenities
communicate information about a community and its heritage.").
108 See, e.g., Griffin v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 274 F.3d 818, 818 (4th Cir. 2001)
(upholding the federal government's refusal to fly a confederate flag over a Civil War
cemetery), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 947 (2002); NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1564 (1lth
Cir. 1990) (upholding a state's decision to fly a confederate flag from its capitol dome).
109 See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gitten, 414 F.3d 23, 25-
29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("If the authorities place a statue of Ulysses S. Grant in the park, the
First Amendment does not require them also to install a statue of Robert E. Lee."); Serra v.
U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1988). But note that, while the
government's decision to buy certain art for display on its own property constitutes its own
expressive choice that can satisfy the tests for formal and functional governmental origin,
sometimes the government funds art or other expression not to claim that speech as its own,
but instead to encourage private expression. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
for example, the Court rejected a facial First Amendment challenge to Congress's
instructions that, in awarding NEA funding for the arts, "'artistic excellence and artistic
merit are the criteria by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."' 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2000)). Without
characterizing the funding program either as government speech or as some type of forum
for private expression, the Court concluded that the statute imposed no categorical restraint
on speech and found no evidence that it would be applied to suppress speech on the basis of
viewpoint. Id. at 585. The Court has, however, noted that content-based distinctions may
be unavoidable in certain arts-related contexts, e.g., where the government makes aesthetic
judgments when selecting projects to fund, id. at 585-86, or when a public library makes
collection decisions, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).
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Like other speakers, the government may use its property for its own
expressive purposes and, indeed, such choices provide valuable information to
the electorate about its government's values. Such speech serves First
Amendment interests in facilitating self-governance when delivered in a way
that clearly exposes its governmental origins both formally and functionally,
thus maximizing prospects for meaningful accountability.I 10
b. Past Practice as a Cue to a Message's Source
Onlookers' expectations based on their understanding of past practice may
also reveal - or sometimes obscure - a message's source. For example,
Justices O'Connor and Stevens agreed in Capitol Square that onlookers might
reasonably conclude that an unattended display expresses the views of the
property owner on which the display appears."' They differed vigorously,
however, over whether a reasonable onlooker should be presumed to be aware
of the particular property's history as a forum for the open exchange of ideas,
as opposed to a vehicle for ventilating the (government) property owner's own
views. Justice O'Connor emphasized:
[O]ur hypothetical observer also should know the general history of the
place in which the cross is displayed. Indeed, the fact that Capitol Square
110 But while a message's location might help establish its source as a functional matter-
i.e., in at least some contexts, onlookers may understand a display as reflecting the
government's views because of its location on government property - to satisfy my
proposed definition of government speech, the government must also establish the
message's source as a formal matter by claiming the expression as its own at the time of its
creation. This requirement not only.maximizes opportunities for political accountability,
but also checks the opportunistic invocation of the government speech defense to excuse
regulation of what is really private speech on government property. Consider, for example,
Brown v. California Department of Transportation, 321 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2003). There,
the Ninth Circuit evaluated a First Amendment challenge to the State's decision to allow
private individuals to post American flags, but not anti-war banners, on highway overpasses.
The court rightly, in my view, rejected the state's government speech defense: "Here, the
government neither hung the flag itself nor delegated that authority nor funded the project -
private citizens spontaneously expressed their message of patriotism by hanging their flags."
Id. at 1224. By simply allowing some spontaneous private displays while removing others
from its property, the state failed the requirement of formal transparency, thus squelching
opportunities for accountability at the initial decision-making stage, and inviting suspicions
of after-the-fact censorship.
On the other hand, the state may freely exercise its own expressive interest in hanging its
own flags or other displays from its overpasses or other property, so long as it makes clear
that the expression is governmental in origin. In short, while it may not pick and choose
among private speakers communicating a variety of messages on government property, the
government may deliver its own message or even enlist third parties to deliver that message.
See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. This distinction, while sometimes subtle,
remains important because it recognizes the value of both government and private speech.
.. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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is a public park that has been used over time by private speakers of
various types is as much a part of the display's context as its proximity to
the Ohio Statehouse." 12
In contrast, Justice Stevens maintained that many reasonable observers lack
such knowledge: "Instead of protecting only the 'ideal' observer, then, I would
extend protection to the universe of reasonable persons and ask whether some
viewers of the religious display would be likely to perceive a government
endorsement." ' 13
While history, custom, and past practice provide cues to a message's source,
this debate demonstrates that their effects can be challenging to assess. Some
onlookers may understand that a display springs from a certain source given
their awareness of specific traditions, but the extent and accuracy of that
knowledge can vary dramatically from individual to individual. These
difficulties in anticipating the reactions of a reasonable onlooker underscore
the benefits of express cues in determining an expression's origin. Indeed, in
Capitol Square, all of the Justices except Justice Stevens agreed that express
notices or disclaimers could most directly clarify the display's source as
private or governmental. "1
4
3. Lessons from Trademark Law
Trademark law also provides a helpful parallel because it tracks similar
concerns about the dangers of message misattribution." t5 Trademarks are
features "used in trade, in conjunction with specific goods or services, to
12 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 781 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting), stating:
The ideal human Justice O'Connor describes knows and understands much more than
meets the eye. Her "reasonable person" comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being
finer than the tort-law model. With respect, I think this enhanced tort-law standard is
singularly out of place in the Establishment Clause context. It strips of constitutional
protection every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to fall below some
"ideal" standard.
114 See id. at 769 n.4 (plurality opinion); id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A]
disclaimer helps remove doubt about state approval of respondents' religious message."); id.
at 784 (Souter, J., concurring) ("I vote to affirm in large part because of the possibility of
affixing a sign to the cross adequately disclaiming any government sponsorship or
endorsement of it."); id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the lack of display
informing "the public that the cross belonged to the Klan and that Ohio's government did
not endorse the display's message"). In contrast, Justice Stevens argued that a message's
location may trump even express signals as a source cue. See id. at 806 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Even if the disclaimer at the foot of the cross (which stated that the cross was
placed there by a private organization) were legible, that inference would remain, because a
property owner's decision to allow a third party to place a sign on her property conveys the
same message of endorsement as if she had erected it herself.").
II5 See supra Part I.
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indicate the source of goods or services and distinguish them from the
commercial offerings of competitors." 16 Trademark infringement actions thus
seek to prevent one party from capitalizing on the additional persuasive effects
of having its product's source misattributed to another, potentially more
credible, party. Trademark law seeks to prevent consumer confusion, which
has the potential to disadvantage both purchasers and providers of goods and
services.1 17  Confusing or deceptive trademarks may trick buyers into
purchasing goods and services they did not intend to purchase, 118 while the
providers of goods and services lose sales when consumers are confused and
deceived."19
Trademark infringement turns on whether the defendant's use of its mark is
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."' 120 To assess the
likelihood that onlookers will confuse competing trademarks, and thus the
source of a particular product, courts examine a number of factors. These
include the similarity of the trademarks, the distinctiveness (or "strength") of
the plaintiffs trademark, the proximity of the goods (i.e., whether the
competitors' goods are sufficiently similar that consumers would likely
encounter both and assume they were produced by the same source),'
2'
evidence of consumers' actual confusion, 122 and the alleged infringer's intent
in choosing the contested trademark.1
23
a. Evidence of Onlookers'Actual Confusion About a Message's Source
Professor Barton Beebe describes this multi-factor test as a heuristic, or
shortcut, for assessing likely consumer confusion: "The test itself is essentially
a substitute for empirical work.' 24 Ideally, courts would themselves conduct
consumer surveys to determine the likelihood that consumers would be
116 Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721, 725 (2004); see
also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942);
George Miaoulis & Nancy D'Amato, Consumer Confusion & Trademark Infringement, 42
J. MARKETING 48, 48 (1978).
117 Bartow, supra note 116, at 744; see also Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in
Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 2020, 2021 (2005).
118 Bartow, supra note 116, at 744.
119 Id.
120 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a) (2000).
121 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1631 (2006) ("The purpose of the proximity factor is to
consider whether the parties' goods are similar enough that a customer would assume they
were offered by the same source .... (quotations and citations omitted)).
122 Michael H. Bierman & Jeffrey D. Wexler, Toward a Reformulation of the Test for
Determining Trademark Infringement, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 12-13 (1990).
123 Beebe, supra note 121 at 1589-90. In addition to these five "core" factors, courts
often also "consider a wide variety of additional factors." Id. at 1590.
124 Id. at 1645.
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confused by the defendant's trademark.125 "But because a court lacks the time,
resources, and capacity to do so, it must instead consider a variety of factors
designed to help it estimate the results of that ideal survey."'
1 26
Professor Beebe goes on to note the value of such tests "in broadly political
inquiries such as those found in constitutional law."' 127 Thus, although this
multi-factor test is not without its critics, 28 it too sheds some light on how, in
another context, courts assess the public's functional understanding of a
message's source.'
29
For example, survey evidence that assesses a respondent's characterization
of a message's source, as well as actual evidence of onlooker confusion - e.g.,
direct evidence through witness testimony that they were fooled into
misattributing a message's source1 30 - might be useful in government speech
cases. Indeed, Professors Shari Seidman Diamond and Andrew Koppelmann
propose the use of such survey and testimonial evidence in Establishment
Clause claims to determine the related question of whether onlookers would
understand government to be endorsing religion.131
Such evidence, however, has significant limitations. It invites the vexing
question of what number or percentage of onlookers need to identify a
message's source as governmental to establish the speech as governmental in
origin as a functional matter. Because the purpose of this inquiry is to enable
political accountability, the number should be large enough to make the
prospect of such accountability meaningful. But how many is that? Fixing the
number with any principled specificity poses substantial challenges.
b. Evidence of a Speaker's Intent to Confuse Onlookers About a
Message's Source
A speaker's intent also may indicate a message's source as private or
governmental. When an alleged infringer selects a trademark she knows to be
similar to that of the plaintiff, courts often presume that she not only intends to
cause the public to confuse the trademarks, but also that she is likely to
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1649.
128 See id. at 1582.
129 While some of the factors seem to have limited application outside of the trademark
realm, others may facilitate our efforts to determine a message's private or governmental
source as a functional matter.
130 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 685 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). But such direct evidence can be hard to find, either because consumers do not ever
realize that they have been misled or because they are reluctant to admit it. Id. Professor
Beebe, moreover, found that such survey evidence "is in practice of little importance" to
courts' decisions. Beebe, supra note 121, at 1622.
131 Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L.
REv. 713, 716 (2001).
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succeed in doing SO. 13 2 As Professor Beebe observes: "Courts that follow this
approach typically reason that 'one who intends to confuse is more likely to
succeed in doing so' or that the defendant's intent 'is relevant because it
demonstrates the junior user's true opinion as to the dispositive issue, namely,
whether confusion is likely." 
133
With these lessons in mind, one might ask why the Sons of Confederate
Veterans or Planned Parenthood or any other organization seeks a state-
sponsored license plate with a particular logo or slogan, when bumper stickers
and license plate frames with precisely the same words or symbols are easily
obtained. 134 Those parties may intuit what social science confirms: that the
perceived source of messages like "The Confederate flag is a symbol of
heritage not hate" or "Pro-Choice" may shape their effectiveness.
Sidestepping easily accessible communicative alternatives to specialty license
plates suggests that these private speakers may believe that the public will
understand this particular message to be endorsed by the government, and thus
seek the added emphatic value of the government's imprimatur for their
speech. 135 When a private speaker bypasses readily available alternatives for
communicating the same view to the same audience, one might infer that she
intends to create - and is likely to succeed in creating - the perception that the
government endorses her views.
On the other hand, ascertaining speakers' motivations can be complicated.
Indeed, speakers may have multiple objectives when choosing an expressive
tool. Those seeking specialty license plates, for example, may also hope to
communicate the depth of their commitment, and/or to direct financial support
to a particular cause. 136 The limitations of these less direct signals of a
message's origin further underscore the appeal of express source cues.
4. Other Possible Source Cues: Lessons from Lower Courts' Government
Speech Decisions
When determining expression to be private or governmental, judges
skeptical of government speech claims have considered the number of
messages in a specific communications context, as well as private speakers'
input into a message's development. 3 7 These potential source cues, however,
132 Beebe, supra note 121, at 1626; Bierman & Wexler, supra note 122, at 14.
133 Beebe, supra note 121, at 1628.
134 See Martin v. Vt. Agency of Transp. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 819 A.2d 742, 757 n.7
(Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Katz v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 425,
426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
115 See, e.g., Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Serv. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 541 n.4 (Or.
Ct. App. 2000) (Wollheim, J., concurring).
136 See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The
Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REv. 419, 424-25 (2001).
"' In contrast, those courts that characterized contested expression as government speech
either required no showing of functional transparency at all, relying only on what I have
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offer only incomplete signals of a message's genesis, again highlighting the
limitations of less direct indications and further emphasizing the value of
express source cues.
a. Multiple Messages as Obscuring a Single Governmental Source
Some courts contend that the presence of a variety of messages within a
particular setting undermines the conclusion, as a functional matter, that the
government could be the author of them all. The Fourth Circuit, for example,
found that the diverse array of slogans displayed on South Carolina specialty
license plates obscured the State as the messages' source: "The array of
choices makes the license plate forum appear increasingly like a forum for
private speech. As the citizen becomes less likely to associate specialty plate
messages with the State, the State's accountability for any message is
correspondingly diminished."
'1 38
But governments, like other speakers, may have a great deal to say on a
large number of issues, and thus may transparently choose to express a whole
host of views, especially when accompanied by an express cue like the state's
name prominently displayed on a license plate. As the Sixth Circuit
emphasized, a state might plausibly choose to use its specialty plate program to
convey a multitude of diverse messages so long as it does not "blatantly
contradict itself in the messages it sends by approving such plates."
139
The government can still be held accountable for a large number and/or
variety of messages so long as they include express cues or otherwise strongly
signal their governmental source. Indeed, the government's choice to promote
a range of messages reveals valuable information about its priorities. The
Postal Service's 2007 slate of commemorative U.S. stamps, for example,
celebrates desegregation and the importance of jury duty, along with Mickey
Mouse, Ella Fitzgerald, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, and vintage mahogany
speedboats. 140 The government clearly remains the author of these multiple
messages as both a formal and functional matter, as the Postal Service made
clear its intent to speak for itself in choosing who or what to feature on postage
called formal transparency, see Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005),
discussed in more detail infra notes 145, 212-216 and accompanying text; Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991), discussed infra notes 202-11 and accompanying text, or have relied
primarily on more express cues, see Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of Va.
Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
138 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798-99 (4th Cir. 2004); see also
ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 382, 383 n.6 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting), cert.
denied sub nom., Hill v. Dixon, 548 U.S. 906 (2006).
"I Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376.
140 A Peek at the 2007 Commemorative Stamps, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2006, at A17.
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stamps, 141 and the express cue "USA" on the stamps signals their source to
onlookers.
b. Private Parties' Input as Obscuring a Message's Governmental
Source
Other courts skeptical of government speech claims assert that private
speakers' input into a message's development signals its nongovernmental
source. Again pointing to specialty license plate programs, they maintain that
the government's invitation to the public to submit proposed content converts
that setting to one reflecting private expression.1
42
But expression may remain transparently governmental in source even when
the government has invited public participation into its development. Indeed,
speakers often rely on suggestions from others when forming their own views,
and the decision to encourage and select from a variety of inputs can be an
expressive choice of its own - and one that provides valuable information to
the electorate. 143 For example, the United States Postal Service's Citizens'
Stamp Advisory Committee invites contributions from the public as to who or
what might be honored with a postage stamp, but the Postal Service expressly
maintains control over the ultimate decision. 144 The government's expressive
decision to honor Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. with a commemorative stamp
based in part on the public's urging does not deprive that decision of its
governmental source, nor should it compel the government to comply with
requests to issue a stamp honoring George Wallace or David Duke. So long as
the government makes clear that it simply solicits input into what it intends to
claim and control as its own speech - thus encouraging public participation but
preserving political accountability as the remedy for those displeased with its
choices - that solicitation should not strip the expression of its governmental
character. 1
45
4' U.S. Postal Service, Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee, http://www.usps.com/
communications/organization/csac.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2008) ("While the Postal
Service relies heavily upon the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee for its advice, it has
the exclusive and final authority to determine both subject matter and designs for U.S. postal
stamps and postal stationery.").
142 See, e.g., Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 384 (Martin, J., dissenting).
143 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998)
(observing that broadcasters by their very nature tend to "facilitate the expression of some
viewpoints instead of others"); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569-70 (1995).
14 See U.S. Postal Service, supra note 141; A Peek at the 2007 Commemorative Stamps,
supra note 140.
145 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005); infra notes 212-16
and accompanying text. In Johanns, the Court characterized as government speech a beef
promotion campaign established by Congress and developed by the Secretary of Agriculture
to advance the image and desirability of beef and beef products. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 561.
Congress and the Secretary provided the overarching message, but left development of the
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Indeed, the government's reliance on the contributions of private speakers to
bolster its message is both commonplace and valuable. Like many other
speakers, governments often draw upon credible third-party sources to
illustrate, bolster, and explain their positions. Consider, for example, a
governor who approvingly quotes the American Lung Association but not a
tobacco company in an op-ed supporting smoking bans in public places.
Because the governor's deliberate expressive choice remains transparently
governmental as both a formal and functional matter, it provides citizens with
valuable information about her priorities and enables them to hold her
accountable for those positions.
The school bulletin board at issue in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School
District146 further illustrates this point. After the school district authorized
celebration of Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month, a school established a
bulletin board inviting faculty and staff submissions to promote the event.'
47
The Ninth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge by a teacher who
sought to post materials questioning the morality of homosexuality.
48
Concluding that the bulletin board's contents continued to reflect the district's
own expression even when it invited individuals to join and contribute to it, the
court held that the district could not be compelled to allow others to distort its
position.'
49
In sum, courts have considered a wide range of possible cues to a message's
source. These include not only express indications of a message's origin, but
also less direct signals like a message's physical location or onlookers'
expectations based on past practice. Express cues most clearly signal a
message's source, and a government seeking to claim speech as its own should
rely on such cues whenever possible. As we have seen, indirect cues vary in
their effectiveness in signaling a message's governmental origins, and thus also
remaining details to an entity with members answerable to the Secretary, some of whom
were also appointed by him. Id. The fact that private speakers contributed to the expression
- the advertising copy and promotional materials were designed by the nongovernmental
Beef Board Operating Committee, only half of whose members were appointed by the
Secretary - did not trouble the Court, because the government retained control over the
ultimate message. Id. In this manner, the government established what I call formal
authorship - it claimed the expression as its own when it created the program. See supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text. But while the public's input did not strip the speech of
its governmental character, the promotions at issue in Johanns were not governmental as a
functional matter because onlookers there had little chance of identifying the expression's
actual source at the time of its delivery. Thus I quarrel with the Court's ultimate
characterization of the promotions as government speech that should remain free from First
Amendment scrutiny. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
146 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).
141 Id. at 1005-06.
148 Id. at 1013.
149 See id.
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in their capacity to further meaningful credibility assessment and political
accountability.
III. APPLYING THEORY TO PRACTICE: SOME RECURRING CHALLENGES
The next Part examines the application of this approach to a range of factual
settings. By exploring in some detail the specific features that obscure or
reveal a message's origins as private or governmental, I hope to illustrate more
concretely the demands of formal and functional analysis, as well as this
framework's prospects for providing a principled approach to resolving
government speech disputes.
A. Joint Governmental and Private Speech: Specialty License Plates
Classifying specialty license plates as either governmental or private speech
raises additional challenges. Because states' specialty license plate programs
"allow individual drivers to choose to buy a plate that advertises a particular
organization's name, logo, or motto,"' 150 they invite quarrels over whether the
plates reflect the views of the government, the car owners, or both. Formal and
functional analysis may be especially helpful in this context.
A number of these programs, which vary significantly in design from state
to state, 151 do not appear to satisfy the test for formal transparency. Often a
state legislature simply empowers an administrative agency to approve public
requests to create specific plate content without making any claim of
government authorship. 152 Just as the government may decide to sell naming
rights to its property, 153 so too can the government abandon any claims that it
"owns" license plates' expressive content. 154 Vanity (as opposed to specialty)
license plate programs similarly reflect this sort of approach, with the
government allowing individuals to select the identifying letters and numbers
that appear on a plate for their own expressive purposes. In vanity plate
programs, the government essentially sells space to private parties, with
traditional First Amendment analysis constraining regulation of the plates'
private expression. 155 The federal government has similarly created a "vanity
stamp program," which allows private users to create content for metered
150 Jacobs, supra note 136, at 421.
' See id. at 426-27.
152 See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. 1099, 1100
(D. Md. 1997); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 05-16971, 2008 WL 217012, at *1 (9th
Cir. Jan. 28, 2008).
153 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., Glendening, 954 F. Supp. at 1103.
15 See, e.g., Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2001) (characterizing a
vanity plate program as a nonpublic forum for private speech); Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F.
Supp. 414, 417 & n.2 (E.D. Va. 1994) (assuming, without holding, that specialty plates are a
non-public forum). But see Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531,
534 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (characterizing vanity plates as the state's own expression).
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postage, rather than for official U.S. stamps (which are considered U.S.
currency). 1
56
Programs like these helpfully contrast the government's available choices.
On the one hand, as is the case with vanity stamp and vanity license plate
programs, the government can disavow formal authorship of a particular means
of communication, opening up the program as a type of forum for private
speech, with any regulation consistent with First Amendment limitations.
157
On the other hand, the government may expressly maintain its intent to claim
ownership of and control over the expression even while soliciting public
input, as the federal government does with U.S. Stamps and as some states do
with their specialty license plate programs.
In recent years, a number of states have emphasized their intent to use
specialty license plates (as opposed to vanity plates) to reflect their own
expressive choices, thus formally establishing the plates' content as
governmental in origin. Indeed, governments often use license plates to
transmit governmental messages - like the District of Columbia's "Taxation
Without Representation"' 158 or New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" plates. 5 9
States increasingly argue that specialty plates simply expand the number of
mottos or slogans endorsed by the state and, indeed, many use the programs to
direct additional revenues - the extra fees paid by specialty plate purchasers -
to specific state policy priorities. In South Carolina, for example, the state's
"Choose Life" license plates were the product of a legislative initiative
culminating in the Choose Life Act passed by both houses and signed into law
by the governor. 60 The Act sought specifically "to promote the expression of
a pro-life viewpoint" with proceeds distributed to local pregnancy crisis
organizations throughout the state.
1 61
Furthermore, as a functional matter, a license plate's prominent display of
the state's name provides an express cue to their governmental source.
162
156 See Annie Gowen, A Tiny Canvas for Holiday Mirth: Personal Postage Is Giving
Letter Traffic a Boost, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2006, at B1.
'5' See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
158 See David Montgomery, Mayor Signs Order for D.C. Democracy Plates, WASH.
POST, Aug. 17, 2000, at B3.
159 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).
160 Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004); see also
Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04-C-4316, 2007 WL 178455, at *4-5 (N.D. I11. Jan. 10,
2007) (describing Illinois's practice of requiring the state legislature to approve proposed
specialty plate messages).
161 Rose, 361 F.3d at 793.
162 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. That the state manufactures and owns
the plates further cues their source as governmental. See, e.g., ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d
370, 377 (6th Cir. 2006); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of Va. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 249-51 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
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Indirect cues to the messages' governmental source include the government's
manufacture and retained ownership of the plates, as well as the fact that
private speakers seek specialty plates rather than readily available bumper
stickers or license plate frames - conveying the same message and visible to
the same audience - suggesting that those speakers intend, and may be likely
to achieve, the public's perception that the government endorses their views. 1
63
At least two dynamics, however, may obscure specialty license plates'
governmental origin as a functional matter. First, states generally invite
multiple private individuals and/or organizations to provide input into specialty
plates' substantive content. Second, and more important, the plates - while
generally owned by the government - are displayed on drivers' private
vehicular property. Here, public input into the message's content, along with
the message's location, signal the possibility of joint speech: the government
and the car owner both engage in expressive behavior when the government
chooses to issue and the owner decides to pay for and display a particular plate.
Lower courts have struggled in addressing situations that appear, like these, to
involve expression shared by both government and private speakers, with some
asserting that the government may never engage in viewpoint discrimination
when it speaks jointly with private speakers. 164 The better approach, in my
The same functional analysis could, of course, apply not only to specialty plates (which
involve choices about additional slogans or logos that appear on the license plate) but also to
vanity plates (which involve choices about the vehicle-identifying numbers and letters
depicted on the license plate). Both appear on a plate manufactured, owned, and issued by
the government and include express cues to its governmental origin by clearly identifying
the state. But, as discussed above, state governments have generally not claimed vanity
plates as their own speech as a formal matter, instead treating them as space for sale, with
any regulation subject to the limits of traditional First Amendment forum grounds.
163 Some might also seek to analogize specialty license plates to transit advertising - a
form of private advertising on government property to which traditional First Amendment
forum analysis applies - thus prohibiting the government's viewpoint-based (and sometimes
content-based) regulation. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 355 (6th Cir. 1998) (characterizing bus
advertisements as designated public forums); ACLU v. Mineta, 319 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81
(D.D.C. 2004) (characterizing bus and subway advertising as nonpublic forums). Indeed,
vanity plates fit this description.
But specialty license plates and transit advertising are distinguishable for at least two
reasons. First, states increasingly claim the specialty plates - and not transit advertising - as
their own speech at the time of the program's creation, thus establishing their formal
authorship. Second, unlike advertising, the plates themselves expressly signal a
governmental source as a functional matter, with the state's name prominently displayed.
Advertisements, in contrast, generally expressly indicate their private source, regardless of
their location. Consider advertising by Pepsi, Toyota, or Wal-Mart, as a few examples. See
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REv. 83,97 (2006).
164 See, e.g., Rose, 373 F.3d at 795-98. In his concurring opinion, Judge Luttig
recognized the possibility of hybrid governmental and private speech, but suggested a
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view, values both speakers' interests in expressive integrity and understands
joint speech to require the assent of both parties, thus permitting the
government to control the content of its own expression but not to compel
others to join it.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged, at least implicitly, the
government's power to control the character of its own expression together
with its inability to force others to join that expression. For example, in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,165 the Court did not dispute the
state's expressive power to decide to start public schools' days with the Pledge
of Allegiance.1 66 Instead, it held that the First Amendment did not permit the
State to force dissenting students to affirm that expression by joining the flag
salute. 167 Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Court raised no quarrel with
New Hampshire's communicative choice to feature its motto "Live Free or
Die" on the State's license plates. 68 The government could not, however,
require an objecting private speaker to display this message. 169
In neither case did the Court find that the First Amendment compelled the
government to provide an alternative pledge or state motto: the Court did not
permit the dissenting private speaker to force the government to change its
message to her liking. 170 Indeed, the government can deliver its speech
without forcing dissenters to submit, just as dissenters remain free to express
their viewpoints without compelling the government to join them. For this
reason, for example, government may choose to print and sell "Support our
Troops" bumper stickers or T-shirts, but not those featuring the message "U.S.
out of Iraq." Those who agree may buy and display them, while those who
disagree can decline and/or create their own counter-messages, but cannot
compel the government to print them. Similarly, a governor could invite - but
not force - a National Rifle Association spokesperson to join her on the
podium at her press conference announcing her opposition to gun control
legislation, without any obligation to share her microphone with gun control
advocates, who remain free to voice their position elsewhere.
Recognizing that joint speech requires the consent of both parties
simultaneously accommodates individuals' autonomy interests and the
government's own valuable expressive choices. Political accountability, rather
than free speech litigation, remains the appropriate recourse for those unhappy
with the government's communicative decisions. States that wish to claim
specialty license plates as reflecting their own views - together with the drivers
balancing test: where private speech is "substantial and the government speech component
less than compelling, viewpoint discrimination by the state is prohibited." Id. at 800.
165 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
166 Id. at 638.
167 Id. at 642.
168 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
169 Id.
170 See Shiffrin, supra note 8, at 567.
2008]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
who choose to buy and display them - should be able to do so, so long as they
design the program to ensure formal as well as functional transparency.
B. Framing Challenges: Government Thanks or Private Advertising?
Government efforts to avoid acknowledging private parties' monetary
contributions or labor present particularly tough government speech questions
because of the different ways in which they might be framed. Whether the
government can exclude the Klan or any other group from Adopt-a-Highway
or similar programs, for example, may turn on how we characterize the
program. We might consider the program as a donation to which the
government may (or may not) respond with thanks, or instead as a valuable
government benefit promising public acknowledgment in exchange for
volunteer services. In other words, do highway signs reflect the government's
speech - "thank you for keeping our highways clean" - or that of the private
group, which may believe that its labor has purchased public recognition of its
efforts? 71 Does the private speaker seek to secure the government's perceived
endorsement or is it simply trying to buy prominent advertising space? 172 The
demands of formal and functional analysis may help us answer these questions.
For instance, almost all states have Adopt-a-Highway programs, which
require those who volunteer "to pick up litter along 'their' mile or half-mile
stretch of highway. The state provides garbage bags and orange safety vests to
the volunteers. Signs are erected bearing the name of the organization that has
adopted the highway."' 73 Until recently, lower court decisions in these cases
rarely addressed the possibility of government speech. The courts relied
instead on various forms of forum analysis to characterize states' exclusion of
the Klan from acknowledgment on Adopt-a-Highway signs as impermissible
viewpoint-based regulation of private speech. 174 To be sure, states were slow
171 Even if highway signs do reflect government speech, there remains the interesting
question of whether the government's positive acknowledgment of an individual or group
could be considered a government benefit triggering unconstitutional conditions analysis. I
hope to address that issue in the future.
172 See Bartow, supra note 35, at 930.
173 Debbie Howlett, States, KKK Clash over Road Cleanup, USA TODAY, July 23, 1997,
at 3A.
174 See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Ark. State Highway and Transp. Dep't, 807
F. Supp. 1427, 1438 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (concluding that the State had impermissibly
excluded the Klan from a traditional public forum - highway rights-of-way -on the basis of
viewpoint). But see Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir.
1995) (characterizing the Adopt-a-Highway program as a non-public forum, from which the
Klan's exclusion from a specific highway was a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral effort to
prevent its efforts to thwart court-ordered desegregation of a nearby housing project through
repeated threats and acts of intimidation).
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to invoke the government speech defense in these cases, undermining any
claims that the expression was governmental in origin as a formal matter. 75
But even if states were formally to announce their intent to claim the Adopt-
a-Highway acknowledgments as their own expression, available cues may
provide onlookers with decidedly mixed signals about the message's source as
a functional matter. On the one hand, the government's production and
ownership of the expressive means (the sign), along with its placement on
government property, indicate the possibility of government endorsement. On
the other hand, the express text of the signs may or may not identify the
state. 176 Indeed, the message's content as well as its source may be contested:
the text (in Missouri's case, "Adopt-A-Highway Sponsor: National Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan") might be understood as a statement of fact, implying that
"The Klan is responsible for cleaning up this stretch of road," or as an
indication of the state's approval or opinion (e.g., "The state thanks the Klan
for its civic-mindedness in cleaning up this road.").
The government's longstanding role in maintaining highways further
complicates this functional inquiry. On the one hand, given that onlookers
may view a party performing a traditionally governmental function as a quasi-
public actor, 177 the government's willingness to delegate highway upkeep to
the Klan or similar groups exacerbates concerns that the public will understand
the government to be endorsing those organizations. On the other hand, we
might characterize the program simply as the state contracting for private
services, with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine constraining the
government from discriminating on the basis of viewpoint in dispensing
government benefits in the form of contracts.1
78
171 See, e.g., Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 708-12 (8th Cir. 2000); cert. denied sub
nom., Yarell v. Cuffley, 532 U.S. 903 (2001).
'76 Brief of Appellants at 16-17, Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-3547). Sign design and text vary considerably from state to state. See, e.g., Adopt
A Highway Maintenance Corporation, http://www.adoptahighway.com/markets.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2008). Some signs make no reference to the state at all; some include a
graphic outlining the state's shape while others expressly identify the state (e.g., "Keep New
Hampshire Clean and Scenic"). Adopt A Highway Maintenance Corporation, New
Hampshire, http://www.adoptahighway.com/markets-nh.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
"I See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374
(2003).
"I Kathleen Sullivan defines the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as requiring that
"government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether." Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
Government actions will most likely run afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
when they appear to target behavior unrelated to the government program. See Louis
MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 79-80 (1996) (contrasting
the government's refusal to fund abortions with the government's withdrawal of welfare or
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Cases like these are especially tough because the available source cues are
mixed and ambiguous. In such close cases, the government should bear the
burden of establishing the expression's governmental origins both formally and
functionally, thus encouraging public entities to maximize prospects for
meaningful accountability. 179 Governments seeking to protect the integrity of
their own expression should design those communications to enhance, rather
than obscure, transparency - ideally, by employing express cues whenever
possible. For these reasons, although I believe that states have a significant
interest in ensuring that they are not misunderstood as endorsing the Klan or
similar organizations, Missouri's Adopt-a-Highway program was not
sufficiently governmental in origin to satisfy the functional demands of
government speech analysis.
80
other benefits unrelated to family planning based on a woman's decision to have an
abortion).
Note that the Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine remains the subject of
considerable criticism. See, e.g., Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The
Children's Internet Protection Act and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment
in Public Libraries, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1070-71 (2002) (criticizing the Supreme
Court's unconstitutional conditions analysis as result-oriented, often drawing "inexplicably
fine distinctions"); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment,
112 HARV. L. REv. 84, 102-03 (1998) (characterizing the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions as "decreasingly useful").
179 Even if the program does not satisfy the test for government speech, Bob Jones
University v. United States might provide a separate justification in some cases for the
government's exclusion of the Klan and other private parties engaging in racial
discrimination. 461 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1983). Bob Jones University involved the denial of a
tax exemption to a religious school that engaged in race discrimination. Id. at 579. Even
though the denial burdened the school's free exercise of religion, the Court found that the
burden satisfied strict scrutiny as necessary to the government's compelling interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education. Id. at 604. But Kenneth Karst also identified
"the core of an argument the Court did not make in Bob Jones University," observing that:
Denying tax exemptions to the University and the segregation academy unquestionably
did communicate the government's disapproval of the free exercise claimants' religious
views. By the same token, however, granting the exemptions would have its own
communicative impact, placing the government's moral support behind Jim Crow
education .... Neutrality was impossible in this zero-sum contest over group status.
Whatever the government might do, its action would have expressive effects that
imposed costs on constitutionally protected values - and expressive effects that
conferred benefits, too.
Kenneth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69
TUL. L. REv. 335, 370-71 (1994).
Similarly, a state might argue that excluding the Klan or similarly racist groups from its
Adopt-a-Highway program satisfies strict scrutiny as necessary to achieving its compelling
interest in communicating its commitment to eradicating racial discrimination. That
interest, however, may be seen as less compelling outside of the education context.
1s0 1 took a different position in my earlier essay on this topic, where I concluded that
Missouri's signs constituted government speech because of the significant risk that the
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But the decision of whether to acknowledge - and, if so, how effusively - is
an extremely expressive activity. Thus, the government speech defense should
permit the government to maintain control over what it expressly claims as its
own thanks, free from First Amendment constraints, so long as it clearly
exposes itself, both formally and functionally, as the acknowledgments'
source. For example, the government might accept gifts of money or labor
from private parties without any promise of acknowledgment, retaining the
expressive choice as to whether and how to acknowledge the gift.18' Examples
include not only explicit governmental thanks - e.g., "The State of Missouri
thanks 'X' for its commitment to keeping our roadsides beautiful," but also
policies in which school districts, with or without public input, name facilities
after individuals "who have made some significant 'contribution' to the school
or community." 
82
Wells v. City and County of Denver 83 provides a helpful illustration of
formal as well as functional analysis of governmental acknowledgments of
private parties' philanthropic contributions. There, the Tenth Circuit held that
Denver could exclude a private speaker who sought to join and alter the
government's acknowledgment of private donors. Denver erected an annual
holiday display on the steps of the City and County Building that included
depictions of a creche, reindeer, snowmen, Christmas trees, Santa Claus, and
elves, along with a large holiday greeting sign. The plaintiff claimed Denver
violated the Free Speech Clause by excluding her display (which proposed to
challenge what she saw as the city's impermissible endorsement of religious
holidays) from what she characterized as a collection of private, rather than
governmental, speech. 84 In support of her contention, she pointed to the
sign's text as expressly identifying the private sponsors as the speakers:
"Happy Holidays from the Keep the Lights Foundation and the sponsors that
help maintain the lights at the City and County Building," followed by a listing
public would perceive the signs as conveying the state's endorsement of the Klan. Norton,
supra note 19, at 1346-47. While that remains a real danger, since that time I have focused
in much greater detail on the specific cues that may signal a message's governmental
source. I now conclude that the demands of political accountability should require
government entities to bear the burden in close cases of establishing authorship of its signs.
Missouri's signs - at least as originally designed - fail this requirement as a functional
matter, because they did not expressly signal a governmental source and because the
available indirect cues sent mixed signals. Missouri's signs also failed the test for formal
government authorship because it apparently did not claim the speech as its own at the time
it created or revised its Adopt-a-Highway program. See Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d
735, 744 (8th Cir. 2004); Cuffley, 208 F.3d at 708-12.
181 See Thornburg, supra note 72, at 336-37 ("[T]he traditional method of naming
collegiate athletic centers is in thanks for the benevolence of university alumni.").
182 Blocher, supra note 72, at 120-21.
183 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001).
114 Id. at 1139-42. The Tenth Circuit separately addressed, and rejected, the plaintiff's
Establishment Clause claims. Id. at 1152-53.
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of six corporate sponsors. 185 She sought to post her own sign on the steps with
the following message:
At this season of THE WINTER SOLSTICE may reason prevail. There
are no gods, no devils, no angels, no heaven or hell. There is only our
natural world. THE 'CHRIST CHILD' IS A RELIGIOUS MYTH. THE
CITY OF DENVER SHOULD NOT PROMOTE RELIGION. 'I believe
in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute.' John
F. Kennedy - 1960 Presidential Campaign. PRESENTED BY THE
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION. 1
86
Denver, for its part, claimed the display as its own speech that celebrated the
holiday season and thanked the display's financial sponsors.
The majority and dissent differed greatly in their functional assessment of
the message's source. The majority emphasized the city's asserted purpose to
thank its sponsors (i.e., its claim of what I call formal authorship), along with
the city's ownership, control, and maintenance of the sign, and the display's
historical context (indirect cues supporting what I call its functional
authorship).1 87 In contrast, the dissent carefully examined the display's text
and concluded that "the language of the billboard is not phrased as a thank you
from Denver to the sponsors. Rather, it is a greeting from the sponsors to the
public. To a passerby, the billboard does not appear to be from Denver, but
from the sponsors ....
The dissent appropriately emphasized the display's text as an express cue to
its source as a functional matter. Indeed, the text should have been
significantly clearer in designating the message's governmental source
satisfying the government speech defense. But if Denver had expressly
identified itself as the source (e.g., "Denver thanks the following sponsors for
this display. . . ."), the government speech defense appropriately permits the
exclusion of private speakers who seek to alter that governmental expression of
thanks.
189
In another helpful example, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the
University of Missouri,190 the Eighth Circuit considered a First Amendment
challenge to a public radio station's rejection of the Klan's proffered financial
support that would have required its on-air acknowledgement.' 91 The Klan
offered to contribute to the university station, and submitted the following
underwriting acknowledgment copy to be read on-air by the station's
185 Id. at 1137, 1140 n.4.
I86 d. at 1137.
187 Id. at 1141.
188 Id. at 1155 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
189 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
190 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000).
191 Id. at 1087. The Klan sought to underwrite National Public Radio's "All Things
Considered" because its local leader "enjoyed the program, wanted to support KWMU, and
hoped to attract more highly educated people to his organization." Id. at 1089.
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broadcasters: "The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a White Christian
organization, standing up for the rights and values of White Christian America
since 1865. For more information please contact .... 192
The panel rejected the Klan's First Amendment claim, holding that
underwriting acknowledgments constituted the university broadcaster's own
expression, with the university free to control its content.1 93 In reaching this
conclusion, the court emphasized that because station employees would
actually utter the acknowledgment copy themselves, government employees'
role as the actual speakers of this message served as an important cue
identifying the government as its source. 194 The opinion further noted that the
acknowledgments' central purpose was "not to promote the views of the
donors, but to acknowledge" - i.e., to thank - donors.
195
To be sure, a public entity that retains the choice of whether and how to
express thanks may undermine its attractiveness to potential donors who
cannot be assured of public acknowledgment. The government may, of course,
encourage private participation by selling advertising space on its property in
exchange for labor or financial support. For example, the government might
promise recognition on a commemorative brick or sell naming rights to a
classroom in exchange for a donation of a certain amount.196  But any
government regulation of what then must be private expression - because the
government has declined to claim it as its own - of course falls under the
constraints of traditional First Amendment analysis, including its prohibition
on viewpoint-based regulation. 197 As an example, consider the program at
192 Id. at 1089.
193 Id. at 1096.
194 The court also emphasized the station's institutional status as a communications
enterprise engaging in expressive editorial choices. Id. at 1093. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, for
example, justifies public broadcasters' selection among potential sponsors as an expressive
editorial decision, supported both by the program's structure and by the broadcasters'
engagement in programming decisions. Jacobs, supra note 54, at 104-05.
1' Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1093.
196 See, e.g., Susan Kinzie, Exacting Donors Reshape College Giving, WASH. POST, Sept.
4, 2007, at Al ("The new philanthropy is more like an investment than a gift .... It's a
business transaction in a way it wasn't even a few years ago." (quoting Trinity University
president Patricia McBride)).
197 See Karlyn Barker, Ad Rules Don't Apply for NFL Bash, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2003,
at BI (distinguishing advertising from "sponsor recognition"); Blocher, supra note 72, at
109 (noting that purchasers of school naming rights "usually describe the arrangements as
'contributions' motivated by a sense of community obligation and charity," while "[c]ritics
counter that the deals are nothing more than paid advertising"). The government might
avoid the choice altogether and abandon the program entirely. A Maryland county, for
example, dropped its Adopt-a-Highway program after the Klan requested to participate.
Tom Belton, Klan Bid To Join Adopt-a-Road Leads to Closing, BALT. SUN, Mar. 6, 1999, at
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issue in Demmon v. Loudon County Public Schools, 198 where a school raised
funds by selling personalized commemorative stones to donors. 199 The court
concluded that although "the school did not intend to create a public message
board to unbridled expression, the school not only allowed, but also
encouraged, brick purchasers to express their feelings about their favorite
student or faculty members. '200 Appropriately, the school did not claim the
program as its own speech because it had clearly offered an expressive
opportunity for sale. For this reason, the school's exclusion of the private
speaker's religious references was appropriately evaluated under traditional
First Amendment forum doctrine. 20 1 While these distinctions may sometimes
seem subtle, there should remain a meaningful difference between a
government speaker's choice of whether and how to express thanks, and a
government's decision to engage in the commercial transaction of selling
advertising space on its property. Again, in close cases, a government seeking
to claim the government speech defense to protect its control over its own
thanks should bear the burden of expressly signaling its authorship, both
formally and functionally.
C. Failing Functional Analysis: Unidentified Government Agents and
Unattributed Government Advertising
Recognizing that government speech is most valuable and least dangerous
when its source is apparent illuminates how the Supreme Court has sometimes
stumbled by failing to require both the government's functional and formal
authorship of a particular message in order to establish the government speech
defense.
Consider, for example, Rust v. Sullivan,20 2 where the Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to federal regulations that barred recipients of Title X
federal family planning funding from engaging in abortion counseling, referral,
or other activities advocating abortion.20 3 Employees of clinics receiving Title
X funding were "expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an
abortion provider, even upon specific request. One permissible response to
such an inquiry is that 'the project does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for
abortion."' 20 4 There, the Court concluded that the government's decision to
198 342 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D. Va. 2004).
199 Id. at 476-77; see also Kiesinger v. Mexico Acad. & Cent. Sch., 427 F. Supp. 2d 182,
184-86 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
200 Demmon, 342 F. Supp. 2d. at 482-83.
201 Id. at 482.
202 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
203 Id. at 177.
204 Id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1989)). The regulations did not require
that the government be identified as the message's source, although the majority observed
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pay others to deliver its chosen message did not strip that message of its
governmental character:
To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis
of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance
certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals
necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous
Government programs constitutionally suspect. When Congress
established its National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other
countries to adopt democratic principles.., it was not constitutionally
required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political
philosophy such as communism and fascism.
20 5
Although couched at the time as an unconstitutional conditions case, 20 6 the
Court later described Rust as a government speech decision, where government
simply paid others to deliver its own views.
20 7
The Court's decisions dealing with public employees' First Amendment
challenges similarly support the proposition that the government's decision to
hire agents or employees to deliver its chosen views does not attenuate those
messages' governmental source. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, for example, the
Court rejected a prosecutor's First Amendment challenge to his discharge for
recommending dismissal of a case based on police misconduct, holding that
the government remains free to "exercise ... employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created. '20 8  The Court has thus
distinguished speech that the government has paid its employees or agents to
deliver - and thus remains free to control - from speech delivered by those
individuals in their private capacities.
20 9
In Rust, however, doctors, nurses, and other clinic employees delivered the
contested counseling and referral speech without any requirement that its
governmental origins be disclosed.210 Under these circumstances, patients
might well misunderstand clinic employees to be offering their own
independent counsel, rather than speaking as agents required to espouse the
government's view that abortion is not a method of family planning to be
discussed.211 Because health professionals may be seen as more credible than
that "[niothing in [the Title X regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his own any
opinion that he does not in fact hold." Id. at 200.
205 Id. at 194.
206 Id. at 198-99.
207 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001).
208 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
209 See id. As I plan to develop more fully in another article, however, I believe that the
Garcetti Court was too quick to attribute employees' on-duty speech to the government,
overstating government's expressive interests while undermining the public interest in
transparently governmental speech.
21o Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
211 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
2008)
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the government in this setting based on public perception of their expertise and
objectivity, patients may have been misled into evaluating the counseling
differently than they would have if the speakers had made clear its
governmental source. Expressly signaling the message's governmental
origins, in contrast, would have permitted listeners to evaluate its quality more
accurately, as well as to engage in political accountability measures if they
thought it appropriate to do so. Rust thus illustrates the danger of treating
expression that fails to satisfy the demands of functional transparency as
government speech free from First Amendment scrutiny.
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass 'n212 offers a more recent example of the
Court's failure to insist on functional transparency as a requirement of
government speech.2 13 In Johanns, the Court considered a First Amendment
challenge to a generic beef promotion campaign the government claimed as its
own. The ads bore only the attribution, "Funded by America's Beef
Producers" - an express cue signaling a nongovernmental source. A number
of beef producers objected to the government's requirement that they fund the
program because they felt the campaign undermined their efforts to promote
their own specialty beef products.
The entire Court agreed that private speakers can be compelled to pay for
government speech with which they disagree, emphasizing that an effective
government requires taxpayers to fund government speech with which they
quarrel.2 14  But the Johanns majority characterized the campaign as
government speech based simply on the government's formal authorization
and control of the message at the time of its creation:
[T]he beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more than
adequate to set them apart from private messages. The program is
authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and
specific requirements for the promotions' content are imposed by federal
regulations promulgated after notice and comment. The Secretary of
Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the program,
appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains absolute veto power
over the advertisements' content, right down to the wording. And
Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to mention the ability
to reform the program at any time. No more is required.
21 5
But more should be required to ensure that political accountability provides
a meaningful check on the government's expressive choices: to constitute
government speech, the public must also understand the speech as
governmental in source at the time of its delivery. As Justice Souter
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1377, 1394-96 (2001) (arguing that patients could mistakenly
attribute the government's views to their doctors); Post, supra note 18, at 172-75 (same).
212 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
213 Id. at 550.
214 See id. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 563-64.
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maintained in his dissent, meaningful political accountability is unavailable if,
as in Johanns, government officials "are allowed to use their control (and in
fact are deliberately using it) to conceal their role in creating the message from
voters with the power to hold them accountable." 
216
As in Rust, the speech at issue in Johanns was not governmental in source as
a functional matter. Thus the Court should have rejected the government's
efforts to characterize the expression as government speech subject to
meaningful political accountability checks.
217
Express cues signaling the governmental source of the ad campaign could
easily solve this problem. Contrast, for example, the facts in R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, where tobacco companies brought an unsuccessful
First Amendment challenge to California's surtax on cigarettes that paid for a
public health campaign criticizing the tobacco industry. 21 8  There the
advertisements bore the transparently governmental tagline: "Sponsored by the
California Department of Health Services. '21 9  Exposing the message's
governmental source permitted onlookers to assess its quality more accurately
as well as to take any desired political accountability measures.
Some might wonder whether this focus on political accountability rests on
too optimistic a view of the citizenry's willingness to hold government
responsible for its choices, pointing to evidence of the public's political
disengagement, apathy, and distraction.220 But the alternative - relying on
courts to perform this function through First Amendment litigation - poses
even greater problems. The Court in Rust and Johanns, for example,
demanded so little that neither political accountability nor First Amendment
litigation provided any meaningful check on the government's action.
CONCLUSION
Because the government's expression is most valuable and least dangerous
when its governmental origin is apparent, I have proposed that the government
216 Id. at 578-79.
217 Not only should the lack of functional transparency defeat the government's assertion
of the government speech defense to First Amendment challenges, but, in some
circumstances, the government's failure to disclose its role in authoring promotional
materials may violate statutory anti-propaganda prohibitions. See, e.g., Letter from General
Accounting Office to Senators Frank R. Lautenberg and Edward M. Kennedy (Sept. 30,
2005) (concluding that the Department of Education's contract with columnist Armstrong
Williams to produce op-eds supporting the Administration's "No Child Left Behind"
initiative, without assuring that the Department's role was disclosed to the target audience,
violated statutory prohibition on use of appropriations for "publicity or propaganda").
218 384 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2004).
219 Id. at 1130.
220 See Fenster, supra note 64, at 928; Domi Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular
Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J.
897,911-14 (2005).
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speech defense should be available only when the government establishes itself
as the source of the contested speech both formally and functionally - i.e.,
where the government claims the speech as its own when it authorizes the
expression, and where onlookers understand that expression to be the
government's at the time of its delivery. This dual requirement maximizes
prospects for meaningful credibility assessment and political accountability by
identifying two junctures at which the government must expose its expressive
choices to the public: when it decides to express a certain idea and when it
actually communicates that idea. While I do not pretend that this framework
will generate easy answers to all government speech disputes, my hope is that
it will force us to ask and focus on answering the right question: whether we
have enough information about the source of the speech to identify it as the
government's in a way that enables the public to evaluate the message's
credibility more accurately and to hold the government politically responsible
for its choices.
